New Platforms will Require New Metrics or Reference Points

July 20, 2015

Brian X. Chen and Vindu Goel, for the New York Times:

Yet only five of the 20 most popular free iPhone apps in the United States have versions for the Apple Watch, according to data from App Annie, an analytics firm. And the number of apps for the watch, which now stands at about 7,400, is growing at a slower rate than the explosive uptick of apps that were produced for iPhones and iPads in their early days.

Comparing figures across platforms is a very limiting perspective. It’s like comparing the number of Windows or Mac apps that were quick to create a smartphone version — and guessing the outlook for smartphones based on that. Or the number of television networks that initially made a Roku app, or the number that worked with Apple to create an Apple TV app.

New platforms support products that perform new jobs. Or perform existing jobs in a new way. So, the way customers approach these platforms and products, and the way that developers approach them, will be different than in the last platform.

As time passes, for instance, we might find that the use of native apps on smartwatches is much higher than on phones. Or that the app growth rate is simply different, even in a healthy market. Moreover, we might learn that the “top apps”, let alone the “top free apps”, on smartphones don’t evenly transfer over to smartwatches. And that the way to measure app activity, and to gauge app success or failure, is a bit different. At this point, it’s really too early to tell, and comparisons to smartphones won’t be very helpful.

In a nutshell, you can’t apply all the thinking from the last platform to the new one. That, in part, is why it’s new. And why it will create new uses, new winners, and new ways to thrive.

The Smartwatch as a Tool

April 24, 2015

Insightful post by Horace Dediu (he runs and writes Asymco, and also works at the Clayton Christensen Institute), titled “The Battle for The Wrist”. Below are key excerpts (bold emphasis is mine).

The Apple Watch offers a hierarchy of surfaces onto which software can compete for attention:

The Complication Layer

The Notification Layer

The Glances Layer

The App Screen

These surfaces are arranged in a hierarchy where the highest is the most accessible and the lowest is the least accessible. […]

It follows then that software which is located at the top of each hierarchy on each device will have the greatest exposure to user interaction and that the device which has the nearest proximity to the user will provide the greatest value to software developers.

This implies further that the most valuable “real estate” for software will be the Complication layer on the Watch. […]

You’ll note that the winners on the phone were different than the winners on the PC. My bet is that the winners on the Watch will be different than the winners on the Phone.

I would put the Watch Face at the top of this list. I’m guessing Horace didn’t mention it because it’s off limits to developers today. If you’ll bear with me, let me explain what seems obvious: Why the face is the most important layer.

First, consider that, once it meets our fashion requirements, a watch is a tool more than it is anything else. That’s because a watch is ill-suited for the other class of jobs a device can do — entertainment (audio aside). Unlike devices that enable both hands to be used (phones, tablets), the watch’s wrist-placement adds friction to most entertainment use cases. For instance, you have to try especially hard to keep it facing you.

On a device that’s a tool, the layer that has the most utility is king. That’s the watch face.

If one accepts that the watch is primarily a tool, it makes sense that the most valuable layer is the one that best embodies low-friction utility: the face. The face is low-friction because it’s the default view. The utility of the face comes from the fact that it displays a set of multiple, varied, structured, data elements. Some elements display the past (elapsed time), others anticipate the future (e.g., next meeting). So, the face is a set of information available in a moment’s notice. In a digital age sense, the face is a tool. No other information layer (complication, notification, glance element, or app screen) has the same default-ness and information density. On a device that’s a tool, the layer that has the most utility is king. That’s the watch face.

(Now, if you don’t consider the face, because it’s off limits to developers, then you’d have to consider the most-face-like contenders: an app that you might continously keep open on your watch, or a Complication.)

With this frame of reference, any hardware, OS, and application attributes that support this utility are especially valuable. Some examples:

Display area that is well suited to structured information and information density
- Rectangular displays work well in this regard. They provide natural positions for information (corners) and the ability to keep segmented information aligned (e.g., left- or right-justified)
Display and watch faces that support many information segments
Good selection of watch faces or complications
Complications that surface information from 3rd party apps
Always-on ambient mode (so that useful information is readily available)
Easy manipulation of what’s shown on the display
Natural language input
Independence from the phone

Today, both Android Wear and Apple watchOS have some, but not all, of these capabilities. Apple Watch, for instance, has a good selection of watch faces and complications. But it lacks custom faces and an always-on ambient mode — two high strengths of Android Wear. Android Wear also allows for independence from the phone.

The odds that Apple would deny developers access to the watch face are low.

Seeing so much value in the watch face (rather than a notification, a glance, or an app) brings me to two final predictions.

A. Whatever the #1 element is (watch face, in my estimate), the odds that Apple would *deny* developers access to it are low. Apple knows, I’m sure, that (developers) x (the most powerful information layer) = (tremendous number of high-value apps). Or if it doesn’t, examples from Android Wear will soon make that clear. I would be surprised if Apple didn’t allow 3rd party watch faces in the next two years.

B. With regard to Horace’s point about “winners” (apps) on the phone vs. the watch: While many games are “winners” on the phone, the list of winners on the watch will have a lower proportion of games and a higher proportion of tools / utility apps. The watch’s position on the wrist, and the limited way of interacting with it, lowers the odds that games will thrive in the same way they do on the phone. That’s not to say there won’t be some break-out successes, but on average, the watch appears better-suited to providing utility, rather than enabling games.

The list of [app] winners on the watch will have […] a higher proportion of tool / utility apps.

It’s exciting to witness what Apple and Android developers are going to create and invent to move this mobile device forward.

How Apple Watch Measures Your Heart Rate

April 20, 2015

From Apple’s support pages (tip of the hat to iMore):

The heart rate sensor in Apple Watch uses what is known as photoplethysmography. This technology, while difficult to pronounce, is based on a very simple fact: Blood is red because it reflects red light and absorbs green light. Apple Watch uses green LED lights paired with light‑sensitive photodiodes to detect the amount of blood flowing through your wrist at any given moment. When your heart beats, the blood flow in your wrist — and the green light absorption — is greater. Between beats, it’s less. By flashing its LED lights hundreds of times per second, Apple Watch can calculate the number of times the heart beats each minute — your heart rate.

Tuesday Evening Assorted Links

April 13, 2015

1. Google’s MVNO detailed in leaked app with per-GB data plans, rollover and shared data, and auto-switching between partner networks

2. Sprint Will Come to Your Home or Office to Set Up Your Next Phone. Is it that much work to do, when it helps you keep high-value consumers? Please email me with thoughts.

3. CCS Insight: Google’s Android One program has had ‘limited’ impact on the market. I can’t remember the last time anyone (media or otherwise) mentioned Android One.

4. Trusted Voice unlock is rolling out to some Android users

5. 15 Reasons Apple Watch Is Going To Be Way Bigger Than People Think

6. Apple is reportedly planning to build ‘well over 20 million’ watches this year

The Worst Things Reviewers are Saying about the Apple Watch

April 8, 2015

Better products = less friction and higher performance, focused on important problems. It helps to learn from success and from failure. And with that introduction:

The worst things reviewers are saying about the Apple Watch (BGR).

I actually found the list pretty tame (better critiques will surely follow in months ahead). The most disconcerting part is from Farhad Manjoo’s review, though BGR didn’t actually quote this part:

First there was a day to learn the device’s initially complex user interface. […] What’s more, unlike previous breakthrough Apple products, the Watch’s software requires a learning curve that may deter some people. There’s a good chance it will not work perfectly for most consumers right out of the box, because it is best after you fiddle with various software settings to personalize use. Indeed, to a degree unusual for a new Apple device, the Watch is not suited for tech novices. It is designed for people who are inundated with notifications coming in through their phones, and for those who care to think about, and want to try to manage, the way the digital world intrudes on their lives.

Apple Watch aims to introduce both 1) a new UI (glances, new home screen, plus Digital Crown and Force Touch) and 2) new habits (wearing a device, off-loading key tasks to it). With that in mind, the most worrisome part of each keynote (and there were two) was the seeming UI complexity. So, seeing Farhad Manjoo struggle, to some degree, further reinforces that worry.

What might be a root cause of this complexity? One issue may be the fact that Apple usually learns for a considerable period from others, prior to releasing its own product. Its product, then, is a measured and careful *reaction* to what has and hasn’t worked. But with Apple Watch, meaningful competitors are few, and they’ve only been out for 18 months (less, if you start counting at Android Wear models). Less time to learn may mean a less streamlined product. What do you think? Email me if you have another view.

The Future of Apple Watch and Apps

April 7, 2015

Credit John Gruber (Daring Fireball), for finding the most interesting part of Abdel Ibrahim’s article “The Future of Apple Watch and Apps” (TheTechBlock).

From the Watch Face, you are able to see your Glances and notifications. In order to see apps, you have to engage the Digital Crown. This makes it seem pretty obvious that Apple has purposely designed apps not to be front and center like they are on iPhone. Instead, Apple Watch apps are mere repositories where stored information can be pushed to the user in the form of Glances and via Notification Center.

This may sound a little weird, and I think to some of us it is. We’re used to apps being the focal point. But on Apple Watch, on initial waking, they’re not.

Apple Keeps Moving Mobile Forward

March 30, 2015

INVENTION

It’s too early to tell how successful Apple Watch will be. But what is clear is this: Apple continues to invent. It was striking, in fact, to realize — as Tim Cook, Kevin Lynch, and Jony Ive presented it – the amount of R&D that Apple has invested into making Apple Watch.

In terms of hardware, for instance, Apple developed unique or highly-customized technology in no less than seven areas. And these aren’t small achievements. They’re not feats of squeezing a camera into a watch or forms of specsmanship. They’re in important areas: related to CPU, interface, sensors, and very fundamental mechanics. The software achievements are equally impressive, spanning a range of 15 different problems Apple had to solve. All of these – hardware and software – are tough, fundamental advances aimed squarely at helping users achieve their goals.

I won’t re-explain each major technology area; others have written and said plenty. Instead, here are several of the high-order points, in my view:

1. The S1. Very customized. As if Apple said “a new class of device deserves a new class of computer”. This degree of customization is the right call – because it affects everything that’s supposed to make a smartwatch appealing and valuable: size, functionality, performance, battery life, and upgradeability. I don’t claim 100% certainty, but I’d venture to say Apple’s competitors don’t take this aspect as seriously. If you have more color, please email me.

2. Beyond conventional constraints. Apple didn’t allow a small display to dictate the terms of user interaction. It envisioned, and delivered, the Digital Crown and Force Touch.

3. The Digital Crown. It’s a zig toward the tactile when the industry has zagged so far toward the digital. (And it’s not for the sake of contrarianism.) Very cool solution. If an Apple car had 10x more of this physical interface ingenuity, that would be amazing.

Also, just as the mouse, scroll wheel, and multi-touch were central to the identity of the Macintosh, iPod, and iPhone, the digital crown really is central to the identity of the Apple Watch. If you had to pinch, or weren’t able to zoom in and out, it would be an entirely different experience.

4. Force Touch and Taptic Engine. These take the most widespread mobile interface, the touchscreen, and make it meaningfully richer. Pretty good achievement. And yes, to say the obvious: some form of Force Touch and Taptic Engine will land on the iPad and the iPhone. Like any new input approach, expect these to be used, over-used, and fine-tuned over time.

5. Digital Touch (the ability to share a tap, a sketch, or a heartbeat). Apple could have taken the best-fit smartphone interactions (e.g., notification vibrations), transferred them to the watch, and called it a day. But they didn’t. Someone stepped back and thought “The fact that this product is touching you *means* something; there may be value in a new kind of communication.” First-rate thinking.

6. Sketch. Time will tell if this perspective matters, but it’s as if the Sketch aspect of Digital Touch combines the best of Instagram (pictures) with Twitter (brevity) and Snapchat (the moment). And speed, a fourth attribute, was inherent in the demo examples.

7. The design, including the bands. The budget and attention here likely rivals the entire investment that any of Apple’s competitors put into their first-generation programs. Perhaps by a multiple. Ditto with the “making of” videos that Apple showed.

8. Heart rate sensor. The difficulty is in getting accurate readings. Let’s see how well Apple Watch performs, and how it addresses the challenges.

9. The incumbents. There is SO MUCH here that traditional watchmakers can’t touch. In short, everything in blue in the chart above. Why? Because of everything else in all the other charts in this article.

10. This is what it takes. This – all this new hardware and all this new software – is what it takes to launch a new category, and to have a shot at success. (And this doesn’t even get into the product management, marketing, and point-of-sale excellence that’s also required.)

A user interface tailored to the form. A communication method tailored to the context. A design that is careful and considerate, rather than a cost-reduced imitation of design. And the custom hardware, software, and manufacturing that optimizes each of these.

These achievements embody Jony Ive’s comment to Ian Parker of the New Yorker. (The quoted words are Jony’s.)

The creation of Apple products required “invention after invention after invention that you would never be conscious of, but that was necessary to do something that was new.”

A DIFFERENT FOCUS

How is Apple able to do this, while competing smartwatches (e.g., Samsung Gear models) deliver features like an “IR blaster”? I don’t think the answer is “complicated”, but it is a multi-part answer, best saved for later. (Many people have a perspective and, by helping my former company compete against Apple, I have mine.) For now, here’s a short version.

At the highest level, it has to do with company identity. Identity reflects the values of the founder(s), and it determines whether a company chooses to prioritize the new or the familiar, and whether it values quality or quantity. In turn, this drives resource focus: where a company allocates its resources – people, processes, technology.

Apple allocates more resources than other mobile companies (call them “component integrators”) in two key areas: Product Direction and Technology Development. The “vision thing” and the “invention thing”. It chooses new problems to solve for consumers, and it creates the technology to do so. That’s the short answer to “how is Apple able to do this?”

In contrast, most other mobile device makers either don’t invent, or they do so very sporadically. If you peered into each and counted the number of leaders, engineers, product managers, assets, and hours devoted to i) identifying new jobs to be done and ii) creating new technology to solve them, you might be surprised. Mostly, they purchase standard, complex components and work hard to integrate them into products.

To be clear, component integrators are important companies. They serve a valuable role: they help many of us get effective, reliable, reasonably-priced products. And the engineers at these companies are some of the best in the world. Component integration that is high quality, fast to market, and cost-effective is quite difficult.

But integration is not invention. As a company of invention, Apple conducts both broader and deeper exploration, it demonstrates the ability to take on higher risk, and it often reaps the resulting greater reward.

A DIFFERENT OUTCOME

Invention and integration produce different outcomes for the companies that specialize in either. Generally speaking, the differences are in performance and impact.

Performance. By shaping their technologies, companies that invent increase their ability to shape their products. Invention enables differentiation. Differentiation – or doing valuable jobs in a better way — enables healthy pricing, and healthy profit. That’s why, in smartphones for instance, the vast majority (~ 99%) of the operating profits belong to the companies that invent the most: Apple and Samsung. Invention isn’t the *only* driver behind their performance, but it’s a major driver. The component integrators, in contrast, have been disrupted. (See Nokia, BlackBerry, Motorola, and HTC.) And Xiaomi? Yes, selling a product for minimal profit will move a lot of units, but the company has yet to make a significant profit.

Impact. Component integrators, by virtue of (mostly) competing on price, help spread technology across the world. That’s important and valuable. But inventing companies also do this. They don’t do it via rock-bottom prices; they do it by offering functionality that’s both powerful and inspirational. Moreover, inventing companies do something that component integrators can’t: they shape the future, they push frontiers. They introduce the hardware, software, apps, or services that previously didn’t exist or weren’t polished enough for mass consumption. They create the NEW. And if it’s good enough, soon others make something similar.

Component integrators bring new advances to market, too (BlackBerry: the keyboard; Samsung: the phablet; Nokia: PureView camera; Motorola: Moto Voice). It’s just that companies that invent are able do so repeatedly and more frequently.

That’s what makes Apple – one of many technology inventors – so fascinating: watching it perform well, stumble at times, and watching it move mobile forward.

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